selinux: Workaround for devices with PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS enforcement
PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS blocks domain transitions from within app_process, unless the new domain is bounded by the app's context. So we can't switch to a domain that has perms not available to untrusted_app :( This means any app can talk to the daemon, bypassing the su executable client. That's not a good thing, and needs to be resolved. Change-Id: I85b74f90b8737caaa193a0555b5262e7392519b2
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@ -44,16 +44,19 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
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## Perms for the app
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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typealias shell alias suclient;
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# Translate user apps to the shell domain when using su
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domain_auto_trans(untrusted_app, su_exec, suclient)
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#
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# PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS blocks this :(
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# we need to find a way to narrow this down to the actual exec.
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# typealias shell alias suclient;
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# domain_auto_trans(untrusted_app, su_exec, suclient)
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allow untrusted_app su_exec:file { execute_no_trans getattr open read execute };
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allow untrusted_app sudaemon:unix_stream_socket { connectto read write setopt ioctl };
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allow untrusted_app superuser_device:dir { r_dir_perms };
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allow untrusted_app superuser_device:sock_file { write };
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allow suclient sudaemon:unix_stream_socket { connectto read write setopt ioctl };
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allow suclient superuser_device:dir { create rw_dir_perms setattr unlink };
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allow suclient superuser_device:sock_file { create setattr unlink write };
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allow suclient untrusted_app_devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl };
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# For Settings control of access
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allow system_app superuser_device:sock_file { read write create setattr unlink getattr };
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allow system_app sudaemon:unix_stream_socket { connectto read write setopt ioctl };
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