0137377289
Summary: frameworks/base keystore rewrite keyguard integration with keystore on keyguard entry or keyguard change KeyStore API simplification packages/apps/Settings Removed com.android.credentials.SET_PASSWORD intent support Added keyguard requirement for keystore use packages/apps/CertInstaller Tracking KeyStore API changes Fix for NPE in CertInstaller when certificate lacks basic constraints packages/apps/KeyChain Tracking KeyStore API changes Details: frameworks/base Move keystore from C to C++ while rewriting password implementation. Removed global variables. Added many comments. cmds/keystore/Android.mk cmds/keystore/keystore.h cmds/keystore/keystore.c => cmds/keystore/keystore.cpp cmds/keystore/keystore_cli.c => cmds/keystore/keystore_cli.cpp Changed saveLockPattern and saveLockPassword to notify the keystore on changes so that the keystore master key can be reencrypted when the keyguard changes. core/java/com/android/internal/widget/LockPatternUtils.java Changed unlock screens to pass values for keystore unlock or initialization policy/src/com/android/internal/policy/impl/PasswordUnlockScreen.java policy/src/com/android/internal/policy/impl/PatternUnlockScreen.java KeyStore API changes - renamed test() to state(), which now return a State enum - made APIs with byte[] key arguments private - added new KeyStore.isEmpty used to determine if a keyguard is required keystore/java/android/security/KeyStore.java In addition to tracking KeyStore API changes, added new testIsEmpty and improved some existing tests to validate expect values. keystore/tests/src/android/security/KeyStoreTest.java packages/apps/Settings Removing com.android.credentials.SET_PASSWORD intent with the removal of the ability to set an explicit keystore password now that the keyguard value is used. Changed to ensure keyguard is enabled for keystore install or unlock. Cleaned up interwoven dialog handing into discrete dialog helper classes. AndroidManifest.xml src/com/android/settings/CredentialStorage.java Remove layout for entering new password res/layout/credentials_dialog.xml Remove enable credentials checkbox res/xml/security_settings_misc.xml src/com/android/settings/SecuritySettings.java Added ability to specify minimum quality key to ChooseLockGeneric Activity. Used by CredentialStorage, but could also be used by CryptKeeperSettings. Changed ChooseLockGeneric to understand minimum quality for keystore in addition to DPM and device encryption. src/com/android/settings/ChooseLockGeneric.java Changed to use getActivePasswordQuality from getKeyguardStoredPasswordQuality based on experience in CredentialStorage. Removed bogus class javadoc. src/com/android/settings/CryptKeeperSettings.java Tracking KeyStore API changes src/com/android/settings/vpn/VpnSettings.java src/com/android/settings/wifi/WifiSettings.java Removing now unused string resources res/values-af/strings.xml res/values-am/strings.xml res/values-ar/strings.xml res/values-bg/strings.xml res/values-ca/strings.xml res/values-cs/strings.xml res/values-da/strings.xml res/values-de/strings.xml res/values-el/strings.xml res/values-en-rGB/strings.xml res/values-es-rUS/strings.xml res/values-es/strings.xml res/values-fa/strings.xml res/values-fi/strings.xml res/values-fr/strings.xml res/values-hr/strings.xml res/values-hu/strings.xml res/values-in/strings.xml res/values-it/strings.xml res/values-iw/strings.xml res/values-ja/strings.xml res/values-ko/strings.xml res/values-lt/strings.xml res/values-lv/strings.xml res/values-ms/strings.xml res/values-nb/strings.xml res/values-nl/strings.xml res/values-pl/strings.xml res/values-pt-rPT/strings.xml res/values-pt/strings.xml res/values-rm/strings.xml res/values-ro/strings.xml res/values-ru/strings.xml res/values-sk/strings.xml res/values-sl/strings.xml res/values-sr/strings.xml res/values-sv/strings.xml res/values-sw/strings.xml res/values-th/strings.xml res/values-tl/strings.xml res/values-tr/strings.xml res/values-uk/strings.xml res/values-vi/strings.xml res/values-zh-rCN/strings.xml res/values-zh-rTW/strings.xml res/values-zu/strings.xml res/values/strings.xml packages/apps/CertInstaller Tracking KeyStore API changes src/com/android/certinstaller/CertInstaller.java Fix for NPE in CertInstaller when certificate lacks basic constraints src/com/android/certinstaller/CredentialHelper.java packages/apps/KeyChain Tracking KeyStore API changes src/com/android/keychain/KeyChainActivity.java src/com/android/keychain/KeyChainService.java support/src/com/android/keychain/tests/support/IKeyChainServiceTestSupport.aidl support/src/com/android/keychain/tests/support/KeyChainServiceTestSupport.java tests/src/com/android/keychain/tests/KeyChainServiceTest.java Change-Id: Ic141fb5d4b43d12fe62cb1e29c7cbd891b4be35d
813 lines
26 KiB
C++
813 lines
26 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2009 The Android Open Source Project
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <dirent.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#include <openssl/aes.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#define LOG_TAG "keystore"
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#include <cutils/log.h>
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#include <cutils/sockets.h>
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#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
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#include "keystore.h"
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/* KeyStore is a secured storage for key-value pairs. In this implementation,
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* each file stores one key-value pair. Keys are encoded in file names, and
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* values are encrypted with checksums. The encryption key is protected by a
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* user-defined password. To keep things simple, buffers are always larger than
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* the maximum space we needed, so boundary checks on buffers are omitted. */
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#define KEY_SIZE ((NAME_MAX - 15) / 2)
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#define VALUE_SIZE 32768
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#define PASSWORD_SIZE VALUE_SIZE
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struct Value {
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int length;
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uint8_t value[VALUE_SIZE];
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};
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/* Here is the encoding of keys. This is necessary in order to allow arbitrary
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* characters in keys. Characters in [0-~] are not encoded. Others are encoded
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* into two bytes. The first byte is one of [+-.] which represents the first
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* two bits of the character. The second byte encodes the rest of the bits into
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* [0-o]. Therefore in the worst case the length of a key gets doubled. Note
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* that Base64 cannot be used here due to the need of prefix match on keys. */
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static int encode_key(char* out, uid_t uid, const Value* key) {
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int n = snprintf(out, NAME_MAX, "%u_", uid);
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out += n;
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const uint8_t* in = key->value;
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int length = key->length;
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for (int i = length; i > 0; --i, ++in, ++out) {
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if (*in >= '0' && *in <= '~') {
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*out = *in;
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} else {
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*out = '+' + (*in >> 6);
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*++out = '0' + (*in & 0x3F);
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++length;
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}
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}
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*out = '\0';
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return n + length;
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}
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static int decode_key(uint8_t* out, char* in, int length) {
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for (int i = 0; i < length; ++i, ++in, ++out) {
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if (*in >= '0' && *in <= '~') {
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*out = *in;
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} else {
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*out = (*in - '+') << 6;
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*out |= (*++in - '0') & 0x3F;
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--length;
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}
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}
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*out = '\0';
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return length;
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}
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static size_t readFully(int fd, uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
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size_t remaining = size;
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while (remaining > 0) {
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ssize_t n = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, data, size));
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if (n == -1 || n == 0) {
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return size-remaining;
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}
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data += n;
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remaining -= n;
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}
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return size;
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}
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static size_t writeFully(int fd, uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
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size_t remaining = size;
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while (remaining > 0) {
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ssize_t n = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(write(fd, data, size));
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if (n == -1 || n == 0) {
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return size-remaining;
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}
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data += n;
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remaining -= n;
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}
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return size;
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}
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class Entropy {
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public:
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Entropy() : mRandom(-1) {}
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~Entropy() {
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if (mRandom != -1) {
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close(mRandom);
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}
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}
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bool open() {
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const char* randomDevice = "/dev/urandom";
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mRandom = ::open(randomDevice, O_RDONLY);
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if (mRandom == -1) {
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LOGE("open: %s: %s", randomDevice, strerror(errno));
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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bool generate_random_data(uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
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return (readFully(mRandom, data, size) == size);
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}
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private:
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int mRandom;
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};
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/* Here is the file format. There are two parts in blob.value, the secret and
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* the description. The secret is stored in ciphertext, and its original size
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* can be found in blob.length. The description is stored after the secret in
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* plaintext, and its size is specified in blob.info. The total size of the two
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* parts must be no more than VALUE_SIZE bytes. The first three bytes of the
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* file are reserved for future use and are always set to zero. Fields other
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* than blob.info, blob.length, and blob.value are modified by encryptBlob()
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* and decryptBlob(). Thus they should not be accessed from outside. */
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struct __attribute__((packed)) blob {
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uint8_t reserved[3];
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uint8_t info;
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uint8_t vector[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
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uint8_t encrypted[0];
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uint8_t digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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uint8_t digested[0];
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int32_t length; // in network byte order when encrypted
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uint8_t value[VALUE_SIZE + AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
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};
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class Blob {
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public:
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Blob(uint8_t* value, int32_t valueLength, uint8_t* info, uint8_t infoLength) {
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mBlob.length = valueLength;
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memcpy(mBlob.value, value, valueLength);
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mBlob.info = infoLength;
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memcpy(mBlob.value + valueLength, info, infoLength);
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}
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Blob(blob b) {
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mBlob = b;
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}
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Blob() {}
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uint8_t* getValue() {
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return mBlob.value;
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}
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int32_t getLength() {
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return mBlob.length;
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}
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uint8_t getInfo() {
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return mBlob.info;
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}
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ResponseCode encryptBlob(const char* filename, AES_KEY *aes_key, Entropy* entropy) {
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if (!entropy->generate_random_data(mBlob.vector, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
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return SYSTEM_ERROR;
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}
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// data includes the value and the value's length
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size_t dataLength = mBlob.length + sizeof(mBlob.length);
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// pad data to the AES_BLOCK_SIZE
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size_t digestedLength = ((dataLength + AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)
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/ AES_BLOCK_SIZE * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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// encrypted data includes the digest value
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size_t encryptedLength = digestedLength + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
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// move info after space for padding
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memmove(&mBlob.encrypted[encryptedLength], &mBlob.value[mBlob.length], mBlob.info);
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// zero padding area
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memset(mBlob.value + mBlob.length, 0, digestedLength - dataLength);
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mBlob.length = htonl(mBlob.length);
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MD5(mBlob.digested, digestedLength, mBlob.digest);
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uint8_t vector[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
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memcpy(vector, mBlob.vector, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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AES_cbc_encrypt(mBlob.encrypted, mBlob.encrypted, encryptedLength,
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aes_key, vector, AES_ENCRYPT);
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memset(mBlob.reserved, 0, sizeof(mBlob.reserved));
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size_t headerLength = (mBlob.encrypted - (uint8_t*) &mBlob);
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size_t fileLength = encryptedLength + headerLength + mBlob.info;
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const char* tmpFileName = ".tmp";
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int out = open(tmpFileName, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
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if (out == -1) {
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return SYSTEM_ERROR;
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}
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size_t writtenBytes = writeFully(out, (uint8_t*) &mBlob, fileLength);
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if (close(out) != 0) {
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return SYSTEM_ERROR;
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}
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if (writtenBytes != fileLength) {
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unlink(tmpFileName);
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return SYSTEM_ERROR;
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}
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return (rename(tmpFileName, filename) == 0) ? NO_ERROR : SYSTEM_ERROR;
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}
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ResponseCode decryptBlob(const char* filename, AES_KEY *aes_key) {
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int in = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
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if (in == -1) {
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return (errno == ENOENT) ? KEY_NOT_FOUND : SYSTEM_ERROR;
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}
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// fileLength may be less than sizeof(mBlob) since the in
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// memory version has extra padding to tolerate rounding up to
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// the AES_BLOCK_SIZE
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size_t fileLength = readFully(in, (uint8_t*) &mBlob, sizeof(mBlob));
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if (close(in) != 0) {
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return SYSTEM_ERROR;
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}
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size_t headerLength = (mBlob.encrypted - (uint8_t*) &mBlob);
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if (fileLength < headerLength) {
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return VALUE_CORRUPTED;
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}
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ssize_t encryptedLength = fileLength - (headerLength + mBlob.info);
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if (encryptedLength < 0 || encryptedLength % AES_BLOCK_SIZE != 0) {
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return VALUE_CORRUPTED;
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}
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AES_cbc_encrypt(mBlob.encrypted, mBlob.encrypted, encryptedLength, aes_key,
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mBlob.vector, AES_DECRYPT);
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size_t digestedLength = encryptedLength - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
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uint8_t computedDigest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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MD5(mBlob.digested, digestedLength, computedDigest);
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if (memcmp(mBlob.digest, computedDigest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
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return VALUE_CORRUPTED;
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}
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ssize_t maxValueLength = digestedLength - sizeof(mBlob.length);
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mBlob.length = ntohl(mBlob.length);
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if (mBlob.length < 0 || mBlob.length > maxValueLength) {
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return VALUE_CORRUPTED;
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}
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if (mBlob.info != 0) {
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// move info from after padding to after data
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memmove(&mBlob.value[mBlob.length], &mBlob.value[maxValueLength], mBlob.info);
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}
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return NO_ERROR;
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}
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private:
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struct blob mBlob;
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};
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class KeyStore {
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public:
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KeyStore(Entropy* entropy) : mEntropy(entropy), mRetry(MAX_RETRY) {
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if (access(MASTER_KEY_FILE, R_OK) == 0) {
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setState(STATE_LOCKED);
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} else {
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setState(STATE_UNINITIALIZED);
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}
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}
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State getState() {
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return mState;
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}
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int8_t getRetry() {
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return mRetry;
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}
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ResponseCode initialize(Value* pw) {
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if (!generateMasterKey()) {
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return SYSTEM_ERROR;
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}
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ResponseCode response = writeMasterKey(pw);
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if (response != NO_ERROR) {
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return response;
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}
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setupMasterKeys();
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return NO_ERROR;
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}
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ResponseCode writeMasterKey(Value* pw) {
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uint8_t passwordKey[MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
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generateKeyFromPassword(passwordKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES, pw, mSalt);
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AES_KEY passwordAesKey;
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AES_set_encrypt_key(passwordKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BITS, &passwordAesKey);
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Blob masterKeyBlob(mMasterKey, sizeof(mMasterKey), mSalt, sizeof(mSalt));
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return masterKeyBlob.encryptBlob(MASTER_KEY_FILE, &passwordAesKey, mEntropy);
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}
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ResponseCode readMasterKey(Value* pw) {
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int in = open(MASTER_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
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if (in == -1) {
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return SYSTEM_ERROR;
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}
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// we read the raw blob to just to get the salt to generate
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// the AES key, then we create the Blob to use with decryptBlob
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blob rawBlob;
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size_t length = readFully(in, (uint8_t*) &rawBlob, sizeof(rawBlob));
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if (close(in) != 0) {
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return SYSTEM_ERROR;
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}
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// find salt at EOF if present, otherwise we have an old file
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uint8_t* salt;
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if (length > SALT_SIZE && rawBlob.info == SALT_SIZE) {
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salt = (uint8_t*) &rawBlob + length - SALT_SIZE;
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} else {
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salt = NULL;
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}
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uint8_t passwordKey[MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
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generateKeyFromPassword(passwordKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES, pw, salt);
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AES_KEY passwordAesKey;
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AES_set_decrypt_key(passwordKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BITS, &passwordAesKey);
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Blob masterKeyBlob(rawBlob);
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ResponseCode response = masterKeyBlob.decryptBlob(MASTER_KEY_FILE, &passwordAesKey);
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if (response == SYSTEM_ERROR) {
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return SYSTEM_ERROR;
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}
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if (response == NO_ERROR && masterKeyBlob.getLength() == MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES) {
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// if salt was missing, generate one and write a new master key file with the salt.
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if (salt == NULL) {
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if (!generateSalt()) {
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return SYSTEM_ERROR;
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}
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response = writeMasterKey(pw);
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}
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if (response == NO_ERROR) {
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setupMasterKeys();
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}
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return response;
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}
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if (mRetry <= 0) {
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reset();
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return UNINITIALIZED;
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}
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--mRetry;
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switch (mRetry) {
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case 0: return WRONG_PASSWORD_0;
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case 1: return WRONG_PASSWORD_1;
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case 2: return WRONG_PASSWORD_2;
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case 3: return WRONG_PASSWORD_3;
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default: return WRONG_PASSWORD_3;
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}
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}
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bool reset() {
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clearMasterKeys();
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setState(STATE_UNINITIALIZED);
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DIR* dir = opendir(".");
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struct dirent* file;
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if (!dir) {
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return false;
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}
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while ((file = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
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if (isKeyFile(file->d_name)) {
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unlink(file->d_name);
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}
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}
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closedir(dir);
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return true;
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}
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bool isEmpty() {
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DIR* dir = opendir(".");
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struct dirent* file;
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if (!dir) {
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return true;
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}
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bool result = true;
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while ((file = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
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if (isKeyFile(file->d_name)) {
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result = false;
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break;
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}
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}
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closedir(dir);
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return result;
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}
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void lock() {
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clearMasterKeys();
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setState(STATE_LOCKED);
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}
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ResponseCode get(const char* filename, Blob* keyBlob) {
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return keyBlob->decryptBlob(filename, &mMasterKeyDecryption);
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}
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ResponseCode put(const char* filename, Blob* keyBlob) {
|
|
return keyBlob->encryptBlob(filename, &mMasterKeyEncryption, mEntropy);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
static const char* MASTER_KEY_FILE;
|
|
static const int MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES = 16;
|
|
static const int MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BITS = MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES * 8;
|
|
|
|
static const int MAX_RETRY = 4;
|
|
static const size_t SALT_SIZE = 16;
|
|
|
|
Entropy* mEntropy;
|
|
|
|
State mState;
|
|
int8_t mRetry;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t mMasterKey[MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
|
|
uint8_t mSalt[SALT_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
AES_KEY mMasterKeyEncryption;
|
|
AES_KEY mMasterKeyDecryption;
|
|
|
|
void setState(State state) {
|
|
mState = state;
|
|
if (mState == STATE_NO_ERROR || mState == STATE_UNINITIALIZED) {
|
|
mRetry = MAX_RETRY;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool generateSalt() {
|
|
return mEntropy->generate_random_data(mSalt, sizeof(mSalt));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool generateMasterKey() {
|
|
if (!mEntropy->generate_random_data(mMasterKey, sizeof(mMasterKey))) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!generateSalt()) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void setupMasterKeys() {
|
|
AES_set_encrypt_key(mMasterKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BITS, &mMasterKeyEncryption);
|
|
AES_set_decrypt_key(mMasterKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BITS, &mMasterKeyDecryption);
|
|
setState(STATE_NO_ERROR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void clearMasterKeys() {
|
|
memset(mMasterKey, 0, sizeof(mMasterKey));
|
|
memset(mSalt, 0, sizeof(mSalt));
|
|
memset(&mMasterKeyEncryption, 0, sizeof(mMasterKeyEncryption));
|
|
memset(&mMasterKeyDecryption, 0, sizeof(mMasterKeyDecryption));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void generateKeyFromPassword(uint8_t* key, ssize_t keySize, Value* pw, uint8_t* salt) {
|
|
size_t saltSize;
|
|
if (salt != NULL) {
|
|
saltSize = SALT_SIZE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// pre-gingerbread used this hardwired salt, readMasterKey will rewrite these when found
|
|
salt = (uint8_t*) "keystore";
|
|
// sizeof = 9, not strlen = 8
|
|
saltSize = sizeof("keystore");
|
|
}
|
|
PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1((char*) pw->value, pw->length, salt, saltSize, 8192, keySize, key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool isKeyFile(const char* filename) {
|
|
return ((strcmp(filename, MASTER_KEY_FILE) != 0)
|
|
&& (strcmp(filename, ".") != 0)
|
|
&& (strcmp(filename, "..") != 0));
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const char* KeyStore::MASTER_KEY_FILE = ".masterkey";
|
|
|
|
/* Here is the protocol used in both requests and responses:
|
|
* code [length_1 message_1 ... length_n message_n] end-of-file
|
|
* where code is one byte long and lengths are unsigned 16-bit integers in
|
|
* network order. Thus the maximum length of a message is 65535 bytes. */
|
|
|
|
static int recv_code(int sock, int8_t* code) {
|
|
return recv(sock, code, 1, 0) == 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int recv_message(int sock, uint8_t* message, int length) {
|
|
uint8_t bytes[2];
|
|
if (recv(sock, &bytes[0], 1, 0) != 1 ||
|
|
recv(sock, &bytes[1], 1, 0) != 1) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
int offset = bytes[0] << 8 | bytes[1];
|
|
if (length < offset) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
length = offset;
|
|
offset = 0;
|
|
while (offset < length) {
|
|
int n = recv(sock, &message[offset], length - offset, 0);
|
|
if (n <= 0) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += n;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int recv_end_of_file(int sock) {
|
|
uint8_t byte;
|
|
return recv(sock, &byte, 1, 0) == 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void send_code(int sock, int8_t code) {
|
|
send(sock, &code, 1, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void send_message(int sock, uint8_t* message, int length) {
|
|
uint16_t bytes = htons(length);
|
|
send(sock, &bytes, 2, 0);
|
|
send(sock, message, length, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Here are the actions. Each of them is a function without arguments. All
|
|
* information is defined in global variables, which are set properly before
|
|
* performing an action. The number of parameters required by each action is
|
|
* fixed and defined in a table. If the return value of an action is positive,
|
|
* it will be treated as a response code and transmitted to the client. Note
|
|
* that the lengths of parameters are checked when they are received, so
|
|
* boundary checks on parameters are omitted. */
|
|
|
|
static const ResponseCode NO_ERROR_RESPONSE_CODE_SENT = (ResponseCode) 0;
|
|
|
|
static ResponseCode test(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, Value*, Value*) {
|
|
return (ResponseCode) keyStore->getState();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ResponseCode get(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, Value* keyName, Value*) {
|
|
char filename[NAME_MAX];
|
|
encode_key(filename, uid, keyName);
|
|
Blob keyBlob;
|
|
ResponseCode responseCode = keyStore->get(filename, &keyBlob);
|
|
if (responseCode != NO_ERROR) {
|
|
return responseCode;
|
|
}
|
|
send_code(sock, NO_ERROR);
|
|
send_message(sock, keyBlob.getValue(), keyBlob.getLength());
|
|
return NO_ERROR_RESPONSE_CODE_SENT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ResponseCode insert(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, Value* keyName, Value* val) {
|
|
char filename[NAME_MAX];
|
|
encode_key(filename, uid, keyName);
|
|
Blob keyBlob(val->value, val->length, 0, NULL);
|
|
return keyStore->put(filename, &keyBlob);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ResponseCode del(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, Value* keyName, Value*) {
|
|
char filename[NAME_MAX];
|
|
encode_key(filename, uid, keyName);
|
|
return (unlink(filename) && errno != ENOENT) ? SYSTEM_ERROR : NO_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ResponseCode exist(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, Value* keyName, Value*) {
|
|
char filename[NAME_MAX];
|
|
encode_key(filename, uid, keyName);
|
|
if (access(filename, R_OK) == -1) {
|
|
return (errno != ENOENT) ? SYSTEM_ERROR : KEY_NOT_FOUND;
|
|
}
|
|
return NO_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ResponseCode saw(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, Value* keyPrefix, Value*) {
|
|
DIR* dir = opendir(".");
|
|
if (!dir) {
|
|
return SYSTEM_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
char filename[NAME_MAX];
|
|
int n = encode_key(filename, uid, keyPrefix);
|
|
send_code(sock, NO_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
struct dirent* file;
|
|
while ((file = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
|
|
if (!strncmp(filename, file->d_name, n)) {
|
|
char* p = &file->d_name[n];
|
|
keyPrefix->length = decode_key(keyPrefix->value, p, strlen(p));
|
|
send_message(sock, keyPrefix->value, keyPrefix->length);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
closedir(dir);
|
|
return NO_ERROR_RESPONSE_CODE_SENT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ResponseCode reset(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, Value*, Value*) {
|
|
return keyStore->reset() ? NO_ERROR : SYSTEM_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Here is the history. To improve the security, the parameters to generate the
|
|
* master key has been changed. To make a seamless transition, we update the
|
|
* file using the same password when the user unlock it for the first time. If
|
|
* any thing goes wrong during the transition, the new file will not overwrite
|
|
* the old one. This avoids permanent damages of the existing data. */
|
|
|
|
static ResponseCode password(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, Value* pw, Value*) {
|
|
switch (keyStore->getState()) {
|
|
case STATE_UNINITIALIZED: {
|
|
// generate master key, encrypt with password, write to file, initialize mMasterKey*.
|
|
return keyStore->initialize(pw);
|
|
}
|
|
case STATE_NO_ERROR: {
|
|
// rewrite master key with new password.
|
|
return keyStore->writeMasterKey(pw);
|
|
}
|
|
case STATE_LOCKED: {
|
|
// read master key, decrypt with password, initialize mMasterKey*.
|
|
return keyStore->readMasterKey(pw);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return SYSTEM_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ResponseCode lock(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, Value*, Value*) {
|
|
keyStore->lock();
|
|
return NO_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ResponseCode unlock(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, Value* pw, Value* unused) {
|
|
return password(keyStore, sock, uid, pw, unused);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ResponseCode zero(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, Value*, Value*) {
|
|
return keyStore->isEmpty() ? KEY_NOT_FOUND : NO_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Here are the permissions, actions, users, and the main function. */
|
|
|
|
enum perm {
|
|
TEST = 1,
|
|
GET = 2,
|
|
INSERT = 4,
|
|
DELETE = 8,
|
|
EXIST = 16,
|
|
SAW = 32,
|
|
RESET = 64,
|
|
PASSWORD = 128,
|
|
LOCK = 256,
|
|
UNLOCK = 512,
|
|
ZERO = 1024,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const int MAX_PARAM = 2;
|
|
|
|
static const State STATE_ANY = (State) 0;
|
|
|
|
static struct action {
|
|
ResponseCode (*run)(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, Value* param1, Value* param2);
|
|
int8_t code;
|
|
State state;
|
|
uint32_t perm;
|
|
int lengths[MAX_PARAM];
|
|
} actions[] = {
|
|
{test, 't', STATE_ANY, TEST, {0, 0}},
|
|
{get, 'g', STATE_NO_ERROR, GET, {KEY_SIZE, 0}},
|
|
{insert, 'i', STATE_NO_ERROR, INSERT, {KEY_SIZE, VALUE_SIZE}},
|
|
{del, 'd', STATE_ANY, DELETE, {KEY_SIZE, 0}},
|
|
{exist, 'e', STATE_ANY, EXIST, {KEY_SIZE, 0}},
|
|
{saw, 's', STATE_ANY, SAW, {KEY_SIZE, 0}},
|
|
{reset, 'r', STATE_ANY, RESET, {0, 0}},
|
|
{password, 'p', STATE_ANY, PASSWORD, {PASSWORD_SIZE, 0}},
|
|
{lock, 'l', STATE_NO_ERROR, LOCK, {0, 0}},
|
|
{unlock, 'u', STATE_LOCKED, UNLOCK, {PASSWORD_SIZE, 0}},
|
|
{zero, 'z', STATE_ANY, ZERO, {0, 0}},
|
|
{NULL, 0 , STATE_ANY, 0, {0, 0}},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct user {
|
|
uid_t uid;
|
|
uid_t euid;
|
|
uint32_t perms;
|
|
} users[] = {
|
|
{AID_SYSTEM, ~0, ~GET},
|
|
{AID_VPN, AID_SYSTEM, GET},
|
|
{AID_WIFI, AID_SYSTEM, GET},
|
|
{AID_ROOT, AID_SYSTEM, GET},
|
|
{AID_KEYCHAIN, AID_SYSTEM, TEST | GET | SAW},
|
|
{~0, ~0, TEST | GET | INSERT | DELETE | EXIST | SAW},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static ResponseCode process(KeyStore* keyStore, int sock, uid_t uid, int8_t code) {
|
|
struct user* user = users;
|
|
struct action* action = actions;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
while (~user->uid && user->uid != uid) {
|
|
++user;
|
|
}
|
|
while (action->code && action->code != code) {
|
|
++action;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!action->code) {
|
|
return UNDEFINED_ACTION;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(action->perm & user->perms)) {
|
|
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (action->state != STATE_ANY && action->state != keyStore->getState()) {
|
|
return (ResponseCode) keyStore->getState();
|
|
}
|
|
if (~user->euid) {
|
|
uid = user->euid;
|
|
}
|
|
Value params[MAX_PARAM];
|
|
for (i = 0; i < MAX_PARAM && action->lengths[i] != 0; ++i) {
|
|
params[i].length = recv_message(sock, params[i].value, action->lengths[i]);
|
|
if (params[i].length < 0) {
|
|
return PROTOCOL_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!recv_end_of_file(sock)) {
|
|
return PROTOCOL_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
return action->run(keyStore, sock, uid, ¶ms[0], ¶ms[1]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
|
|
int controlSocket = android_get_control_socket("keystore");
|
|
if (argc < 2) {
|
|
LOGE("A directory must be specified!");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (chdir(argv[1]) == -1) {
|
|
LOGE("chdir: %s: %s", argv[1], strerror(errno));
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Entropy entropy;
|
|
if (!entropy.open()) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (listen(controlSocket, 3) == -1) {
|
|
LOGE("listen: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
|
|
|
|
KeyStore keyStore(&entropy);
|
|
int sock;
|
|
while ((sock = accept(controlSocket, NULL, 0)) != -1) {
|
|
struct timeval tv;
|
|
tv.tv_sec = 3;
|
|
setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv, sizeof(tv));
|
|
setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof(tv));
|
|
|
|
struct ucred cred;
|
|
socklen_t size = sizeof(cred);
|
|
int credResult = getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred, &size);
|
|
if (credResult != 0) {
|
|
LOGW("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
} else {
|
|
int8_t request;
|
|
if (recv_code(sock, &request)) {
|
|
State old_state = keyStore.getState();
|
|
ResponseCode response = process(&keyStore, sock, cred.uid, request);
|
|
if (response == NO_ERROR_RESPONSE_CODE_SENT) {
|
|
response = NO_ERROR;
|
|
} else {
|
|
send_code(sock, response);
|
|
}
|
|
LOGI("uid: %d action: %c -> %d state: %d -> %d retry: %d",
|
|
cred.uid,
|
|
request, response,
|
|
old_state, keyStore.getState(),
|
|
keyStore.getRetry());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
close(sock);
|
|
}
|
|
LOGE("accept: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|